Writer: Sharif Behruz
Opinion
On August 13, 2018, in a high-stakes address that would define the regime’s final decade, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a defiant decree: "There will be no war, and there will be no negotiations." This was not mere rhetoric; according to Khamenei’s official platform, this stance was the product of "calculated analysis" rather than a bluff. The regime cited the failed "Tabas" operation of 1980 as divine proof that the United States was destined to be the "100% losing side" in any conflict. To solidify this deterrence, the platform warned that while Iran would not start the war, once engaged, it would enter with "full force."
However, when the moment of truth arrived, that "full force" never materialized. It was not for a lack of will, but a lack of ability. Despite decades of propaganda, the regime’s military apparatus proved incapable of matching the technological superiority of its adversaries. In a stark historical irony, the "no war" guarantee evaporated, the "no negotiations" pledge was shattered, and the man who authored the strategy was killed by the very forces he claimed were too paralyzed to act.
Untangling the Doctrine
Khamenei’s refusal to seek peace was an ideological commitment to permanent friction. By "no negotiations" he meant the Islamic Republic would never abandon its hostility toward the West, Israel, and several neighboring Gulf states. This doctrine relied on using a network of regional proxies as a "forward defense" shield, designed to project instability outward while keeping the battlefield away from Iranian soil. Tehran operated under the delusion that this proxy architecture granted them a "veto" over regional security. They believed that by igniting multiple fronts simultaneously, no country—including the United States—would ever be in a position to strike the heart of the regime. In their view, their capacity for regional chaos made a direct attack on Iran unthinkable. This "calculated analysis" was built on five flawed pillars:
The Ghost of Tabas: The 1980 failure of Operation Eagle Claw—the aborted U.S. mission to rescue hostages in Tehran—became the cornerstone of the regime’s "divine protection" narrative. For forty-five years, Tehran’s propaganda machine framed the Tabas incident not as a technical failure in a sandstorm, but as a supernatural intervention. By obsessing over this historical fluke, the leadership convinced itself that the U.S. was metaphysically incapable of conducting a successful operation on Iranian soil. Even in his pivotal August 2018 address, Khamenei pointedly referenced the "humiliating debacle" at Tabas to justify his certainty that a new war was impossible, taunting that while the Americans "may not understand lots of things," they surely remembered the outcome of that invasion. This reliance on a four-decade-old anomaly rendered the leadership strategically deaf to the realities of modern warfare.
The Post Iraq-Afghanistan Quagmire: Following the lengthy, exhausting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops, Tehran was under the firm impression that neither the American government nor public opinion had the stomach for another conflict. They believed they had successfully created a regional quagmire so toxic that Washington would perpetually fear repeating the same mistakes, especially against a country as fortified as Iran.
Hegemonic Deterrence: Tehran believed its investment in an asymmetric war machine—thousands of low-cost drones and ballistic missiles—had reached a threshold where a conventional war was "impossible" for any adversary to contemplate. The logic was that the cost of an attack—measured in the destruction of regional oil infrastructure—would be too high for the West to stomach. They believed they were "too expensive to attack."
The Russian Shield: The war in Ukraine provided Tehran with what it believed was a new layer of geopolitical armor. By becoming the primary supplier of munitions to Russia, Iran’s leaders felt they had graduated to a global essential. They were willing to scorched-earth their remaining relations with Europe just to prove they were a "great power" that had to be reckoned with, believing the West would avoid escalation to prevent a broader global conflict.
The "Isolationist" President: Tehran’s analysts viewed the "America First" doctrine as a sign of fundamental American retreat. They mistook a transactional approach to foreign policy for a total aversion to kinetic action. In the Iranian echo chamber, they believed that as long as they didn't directly sink a U.S. aircraft carrier, the President would prioritize his domestic base over military escalation.
The Great Miscalculation
These assumptions created a fatal blind spot. The regime chose to label the American President a "gambler" and a "bluffer," a characterization famously popularized by Qasem Soleimani in a defiant speech on July 16, 2018, where he taunted, "Mr. Gambler, Trump! I’m telling you that we are close to you... You will start the war but we will end it." This arrogance eventually led to Soleimani’s own demise on January 3, 2020, when a targeted U.S. drone strike near Baghdad International Airport proved that the "gambler" was willing to call the regime’s highest-stakes bluff.
The death of Soleimani was more than a tactical loss; it was the empirical refutation of the "No War, No Peace" doctrine. By eliminating the chief architect of Iran’s regional shadow war, the U.S. effectively declared that the "Gray Zone"—the space where Tehran believed it could provoke without consequence—had been closed. Khamenei’s 2018 decree had relied on the assumption that the U.S. was too paralyzed by past failures to take such a radical step. When the strike occurred, it exposed a fundamental flaw in the regime's analysis: they had mistaken American restraint for American inability. This decapitation strike proved that the "No War" guarantee was a paper tiger, yet the leadership remained trapped in their own dogma, unable to pivot even as the ground shifted beneath them. They failed to account for:
The alliance between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, two leaders who demonstrated a shared, uncompromising commitment to the state of Israel and an equal disdain for the regime of the Islamic Republic. Iranian leadership likely perceived the U.S. government as weak or distracted and viewed the October 7th attacks as a strategic window to strike at Israel before a new, potentially more aggressive administration could take office. While Tehran took Trump’s threats seriously on paper, they incorrectly categorized him as a non-interventionist businessman who viewed foreign policy strictly as a business enterprise. This led to the adoption of the 'TACO' (Trump Always Chickens Out) expression—a belief widely held in Iranian circles that was reinforced after watching the President threaten massive tariffs only to back down during trade negotiations. The regime interpreted these economic pivots as a fundamental character trait, convinced that his military rhetoric was a similar bluff and that he would eventually retreat to avoid the high costs of war.
They labeled him "the gambler," failing to realize that for Trump, maintaining an image of strength was paramount. In their hubris, they believed that by intensifying these provocations, they could at best keep the U.S. at arm's length or, at worst, force a favorable deal—failing to realize that such actions would only ensure a more violent response from President Trump and his Israeli ally, who had been waiting for this moment for forty years.
The Failure of Asymmetric Supremacy: Following the targeted killing of Soleimani, Iran believed it had successfully transitioned into an indirect war where it held the upper hand. They viewed themselves as the undisputed masters of asymmetric warfare, confident they could inflict more damage through proxies than the U.S. or Israel could return. This arrogance extended to their territorial defense; Tehran assumed Israel would never risk the logistical and political nightmare of flying over multiple borders to strike Iranian soil. When Israel finally did penetrate those skies to make a point, it didn't just hit a target; it exposed Iran’s projected power as a facade. This was further solidified by subsequent U.S. strikes on nuclear facilities, which proved that the American military could and would engage Iran directly on its own territory, bypassing the "shadow war" entirely.
The Fall of the Syrian Corridor and the Proxy Illusion: Tehran’s regional strategy was underpinned by the survival of its "land bridge," banking on Bashar al-Assad remaining a permanent fixture in Damascus to funnel supplies to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. However, the regime’s strategic depth evaporated as Israel dealt a series of devastating, decapitating blows to these groups before ever turning its full attention to Iran itself. With Assad’s subsequent fall from power, that essential transit point has been severed, exposing the "Axis of Resistance" as a hollow shield. When the moment of truth arrived, this proxy network proved it lacked both the will and the capacity for a coordinated defense; aside from sporadic, ineffective fire from Lebanon and Iraq, the promised "full force" of Iran’s regional outreach was non-existent, leaving the regime’s forward defense in ruins.
Technological Evolution: Ultimately, the Iranian military command remained trapped in an outdated mindset forged during the Iran-Iraq War. They relied on the historical assumption that the U.S. would only intervene if it were prepared to put "boots on the ground," a prospect they believed the American public would never support. Blinded by their own domestic propaganda, they failed to account for the lethality of modern military technology. In an era of precision drones, satellite-guided missiles, and advanced surveillance, the need for a ground invasion has been replaced by the ability to decimate an enemy's infrastructure and command from a distance. By the time Tehran realized the rules of engagement had changed, their strategic deterrents had been dismantled, leaving them to face a high-tech reality they were fundamentally unprepared to navigate.
The Performance of Power: Why Regime Still Negotiates
Despite the collapse of their strategic pillars, the remnants of the regime continue to engage in dialogue, though not for the sake of genuine diplomacy. Their persistence at the table is driven by three cynical calculations:
The Mirage of Equality: For the regime, sitting face-to-face with the United States or European powers provides a veneer of legitimacy. In the past, they felt treated as a peer, though the current U.S. administration has dismantled this illusion. Even as the President "trolls" their negotiators and denies them the respect they crave, the mere act of being at the table allows Tehran to project the image of a "superpower" to its remaining domestic base and regional adversaries.
The "Outlasting" Strategy: Tehran views the American presidency through a lens of temporary cycles. The regime, unbound by the power of the ballot, has outlasted seven U.S. presidents, watching as each failed to extract meaningful concessions—until now. They negotiate to buy time, hoping to survive until a new administration in the White House potentially changes course and offers a more lenient path.
Negotiating for Survival, Not Solvency: In previous years, Tehran negotiated to relieve economic pressure and end international isolation. Today, the stakes are existential. These negotiations are a desperate attempt to halt kinetic attacks and prevent the further decapitation of their leadership. They have shown no intention of yielding on core demands; the table is simply a shield to deflect further military strikes while they attempt to regroup.
Today, the remnants of the regime find themselves in the exact position Khamenei swore would never happen. After years of declaring they would never negotiate with "Soleimani’s killers," they are now sitting face-to-face not only with those responsible for the general's death but with the very architects behind the elimination of their own Supreme Leader.
Miscalculating the Collapse: The Limits of American Pressure
While Tehran misread Washington, the United States similarly underestimated the structural resilience of the Islamic Republic. The American strategy relied on the assumption that by eliminating the top leadership, the rest of the apparatus would crumble and the Iranian people would seize the moment to overthrow the regime. Neither has occurred. The regime has proven capable of maintaining its command-and-control, continuing to deploy missiles and drones while keeping a tight lid on internal dissent.
Furthermore, the administration initially underestimated the economic ripple effects of the war—specifically Tehran’s long-standing threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. The current pause in hostilities is not a sign of American retreat, but a tactical recalibration. Washington is using this 20-day window to calm global markets and reassure its domestic base while simultaneously preparing for a more decisive phase: the potential deployment of elite ground troops to secure the Iranian coastline and the Strait. Meanwhile, Israel is utilizing this lull to dismantle the remaining proxy threats to its north and gather the critical intelligence required to neutralize the regime’s infrastructure and surveillance networks once the war resumes.
The U.S. is not offering a "grand bargain"; it is using the diplomatic table to manage a surrender. Washington’s terms have grown more aggressive, reflecting a realization that Tehran no longer holds the regional cards necessary to negotiate from a position of strength. This has evolved into a series of stark ultimatums that leave the remnants of the regime with no choice but to concede or face total internal and external collapse.
Ultimately, the "No War, No Negotiations" doctrine did not preserve the regime; it guaranteed its isolation until the "no war" half of the equation was violently corrected. Khamenei’s 2018 decree was not a prophecy of strength, but a roadmap to his own demise, proving that being the "losing side" was a fate reserved for those who believe their own propaganda.
About: Sharif Behruz
Sharif Behruz is the Managing Editor of Kurdistan Agora, the English-language platform for the Tishk Centre for Kurdistan Studies, where he also serves as a contributor. A Political Science graduate from the University of Western Ontario, Behruz has a distinguished career in human rights advocacy and international diplomacy. He has collaborated with various human rights organizations specifically focusing on the rights of Kurds in Iran, and spent several years representing Kurdish interests in the US and Canada. His work offers a critical vantage point on the intersection of Western foreign policy, decentralization and the struggle for a federal, democratic Iran.