ARTICLE
Abstract:
()For over half a century, the relationship between the United States and Kurdish actors in the Middle East has been dictated by short-term security imperatives and the shifting tides of regional power balancing. This article analyzes four critical historical junctures to demonstrate why Washington consistently withdraws political support from Kurdish forces after utilizing their military capabilities to achieve localized strategic objectives.
1. Analytical Framework: Structural Realism and National Interest
From the perspective of Realism in International Relations, state behavior is driven by "national cost-benefit analysis." To the United States, the Kurds represent highly effective non-state actors capable of applying pressure on hostile central governments or suppressing extremist organizations. However, to maintain stability within the Westphalian system and avoid irreparable friction with strategic allies (such as NATO members), Washington's support for the Kurds rarely evolves into a commitment to their long-term political sovereignty.
2. Historical Evidence of Strategic Disengagement
A) The Algiers Accord (1975): Prioritizing Regional Stability over Moral Obligation
In the early 1970s, the CIA, in coordination with the Iranian government, funded a Kurdish insurgency against the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. Washington's primary goal was to weaken Soviet influence in Baghdad. As soon as Iran and Iraq reached a border agreement via the Algiers Accord in 1975, the U.S. abruptly terminated all aid at the behest of Henry Kissinger. This event serves as the first major precedent where "stability between states" was prioritized over the survival of a local ally.
B) Post-Gulf War (1991): The Vacuum of Strategic Support
Following Operation Desert Storm, the administration of George H.W. Bush encouraged Kurds to rise up against Saddam Hussein. However, fearing a total collapse of the Iraqi state structure—which could have created a power vacuum benefiting Iran—the U.S. withheld military intervention, allowing the Ba'athist military to brutally suppress the uprising.
C) The Kurdistan Region Independence Referendum (2017): The Primacy of "Unified Iraq"
Kurdish forces were widely recognized as the most effective ground force in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Nevertheless, when the leadership of the Kurdistan Region moved toward independence in 2017, Washington adopted a stance of "neutrality leaning toward Baghdad." This allowed Iraqi central forces to reclaim strategic territories, including Kirkuk, proving that the principle of "territorial integrity" outweighs the Kurdish right to self-determination in U.S. regional policy.
D) Withdrawal from Northern Syria (2019): Negotiating with Regional Powers
In October 2019, the White House’s sudden decision to withdraw troops from the Syrian-Turkish border left the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) exposed to a Turkish military offensive. This move underscored that in the hierarchy of American security interests, maintaining relations with a NATO ally (Turkey) consistently takes precedence over an alliance with a non-state actor, regardless of their prior sacrifices in the fight against terrorism.
3. Conclusion
The historical trajectory of U.S. foreign policy indicates that engagement with the Kurds is not a long-term strategy but rather a "task-oriented alliance." The United States utilizes Kurdish forces for crisis management; however, due to geopolitical constraints and pressure from central governments (Ankara, Baghdad, and Damascus), it refrains from converting this military cooperation into a sustainable political umbrella. Ultimately, in U.S. security doctrine, the Kurds remain in a state of "suspensio between military necessity and political cost."